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 Abstract:  
We scrutinize and compare, from the perspective of modern theory of social choice, 
two rules that have been used to rank competitors in Figure Skating for the past 
decades. The first rule has been in use at least from 1982 until 1998, when it was 
replaced by a new one. We also compare these two rules with the Borda and the 
Kemeny rules. The four rules are illustrated with examples and with the data of 30 
Olympic competitions. The comparisons show that the choice of a rule can have a 
real impact on the rankings. In these data, we found as many as 19 cycles of the 
majority relation, involving as many as nine skaters. In this context, the Kemeny rule 
appears as a natural extension of the Condorcet rule. As a side result, we show that 
the Copeland rule can be used to partition the skaters in such a way that it suffice to 
find Kemeny rankings within subsets of the partition that are not singletons and  then, 
to juxtapose these rankings to get a complete Kemeny ranking. We also propose the 
concept of the mean Kemeny ranking, which when it exists, may obviate the 
multiplicity of Kemeny rankings. Finally, the fours rules are examined in terms of their 
manipulability. It appears that the new rule used in Figure Skating may be more 
difficult to manipulate than the previous one but less so than the Kemeny rule. 
  
Keywords: Figure skating, ranking rules, vote aggregation, cycles, maximum 
likelihood, Kemeny, Copeland, Borda, manipulation 
 
JEL Classification: D710 
 
Résumé: 
Nous analysons et comparons, à la lumière de la théorie moderne du choix social, 
deux règles qui ont été utilisées au cours des dernières décennies pour classer les 
compétiteurs en patinage artistique. La première a été en usage de 1982 jusqu'à 
1998, année où elle a été remplacée pas une nouvelle règle. Nous comparons 
également ces deux règles à celles de Borda et de Kemeny. Les quatre règles sont 
illustrées à l'aide d'exemples et avec les données de 30 compétitions olympiques. 
Les comparaisons montrent que différentes règles peuvent donner des résultats forts 
différents. Dans ces données, nous avons trouvé 19 cycles de la relation majoritaire, 
impliquant jusqu'à neuf compétiteurs. Dans ce contexte, la règle de Kemeny apparaît 
comme une extension naturelle de celle de Condorcet. Comme autre résultat, nous 
montrons que la règle de Copeland peut être utilisée pour partitionner les 
compétiteurs de telle sorte qu'il suffit de trouver un ordre de Kemeny sur chaque 
sous-ensemble de la partition et de juxtaposer ensuite ces derniers pour obtenir un 
ordre de Kemeny complet. Nous proposons également le concept d'ordre de Kemeny 
moyen qui, lorsqu'il existe, peut palier la multiplicité des ordres de Kemeny. 
Finalement, les quatre règles sont examinées du point de vue des possibilités de 
manipulation. Il ressort que la nouvelle règle utilisée en patinage artistique a des 
chances d'être plus difficile à manipuler que l'ancienne mais moins que la règle de 
Kemeny. 
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ii1 Introduction
An extensive literature has been devoted to the design of social welfare functions, i.e. rules
for aggregating individual preferences or rankings on a set of alternatives into a collective
preference or ﬁnal ranking. Yet, there are not very many instances in real life where the
preoccupation is to arrive at a collective preference or ranking, as opposed to merely choosing
an alternative or a subset of alternatives. A notable exception is professional sport, where a
wide variety of methods are used to aggregate individual rankings into a ﬁnal ranking. These
methods are especially prominent in judged sports such as diving, synchronized swimming,
gymnastics, and ﬁgure skating, but we also ﬁnd examples of their use in some professional
sports where ranking could be made from objective data. See for instances Jech (1983),
Benoit (1992), and Levin and Nalebuﬀ (1995).
Among judged sports, ﬁgure skating has probably become the most popular. Almost
everybody knows that skaters are ranked from the marks that they receive from a panel of
judges. However, very few people know that these marks merely serve to establish a ranking
of the skaters for each judge, displayed as ordinals under the marks. These ordinal rankings
(not the marks) are then aggregated into a ﬁnal ranking according to a complex rule that
has changed through time. Given the complexity of the procedure used in some periods, this
ignorance is quite understandable.
In this paper, we scrutinize and compare two rules that have been prescribed by the
International Skating Union (ISU) for the past decades, from the perspective of modern
theory of social choice. The ﬁrst one is described, inter alia, in the Regulations of the ISU
for 1982 and for 1994. We call it the ISU-94 rule. It has been replaced in 1998 by a simpler
rule that we call the ISU-98 rule. We also compare them to other rules, including the Kemeny
rule which seems well suited to the context of ﬁgure skating.
T h eI S U - 9 4r u l eu s e sf o u rd i ﬀerent criteria to arrive at a ﬁnal ranking. The ﬁrst is the
median rank of the skaters, i.e. the best rank that a skater obtains from a majority of judges.
If two skaters obtain the same median rank, one tries to break the tie by reverting to the
numbers of judges contributing to the median rank of each skater. If this is not suﬃcient to
break all ties, one then tries to do so by using the sum of ranks that are smaller or equal
to the median rank. If there still remains some ties after applying this third criterion, one
uses the sum of ranks given by all judges, which is equivalent to the Borda count. Finally,
if all ties are not resolved after these four principles have been applied, competitors who
1tie for a rank obtain the same rank. We show that the ISU-94 rule can also be deﬁned as
the successive application of approval rules, where the number of acceptable competitors is
increased by one at each step.
Bassett and Persky (1994), hereafter BP, analyze the ISU-94 rule. They concentrate
their analysis on the ﬁrst criterion that they call the Median Rank Principle (MRP). They
show that this principle responds positively to increased marks by each judge and respects
the view of a majority of judges when this majority agrees on a skater’s rank. They also
demonstrate that (MRP) is the only one to possess these two properties. Moreover, they
claim that this principle provides strong safeguards against manipulation by a minority of
judges.
B a s e do nt h eﬁndings of Saari (1990)1, we challenge this view of BP. We also stress
the fact, also mentioned by BP, that this principle may conﬂict with another prominent
majority principle advocated by Condorcet (1785), which prescribes that if a competitor is
ranked ahead of another competitor by an absolute majority of judges, he should be ahead
in the ﬁnal ranking. It is well known that this principle may fail to give a consistent ranking
because of a cycle in the majority relation, a possibility that Condorcet was well aware of.
For example, A may be judged better than B by a strict majority of judges, who may be
judged better than C, who may be judged better than D, and D may be judged better than
A.
These cycles are not just a theoretical possibility. We found as many as 19 cycles in
the data of 30 Olympic competitions. They involve as many as nine skaters. These are
often middle ranked skaters, as if the disagreements between the judges occur mainly for
competitors who are not medal contenders. However, in one case, these are famous skaters.
In another case, one of the skaters in the cycle actually obtained the third place in the ISU-94
ranking. These cycles never prevented the occurrence of a Condorcet winner, except in one
instance where two skaters tied for this title under the ISU-94 rule.
Despite the possibility of cycles, there is still something to be drawn from Condorcet’s
prescription. A more general criterion, called the Extended Condorcet Criterion (XCC), is
proposed in this paper. Loosely speaking, it says that if a competitor is ranked consistently
1Saari shows that among all scoring voting procedures (including approval rules), the Borda rule is the
method that either minimizes, or comes close to minimizing, the likelihood of a successful manipulation by a
small group of individuals. Thus, as a combination of scoring rules, (MRP) cannot do better than the Borda
rule, which is well known for its susceptibility to manipulation.
2ahead of another competitor by an absolute majority of judges, he or she should be ahead in
the ﬁnal ranking. Consistency here refers to the absence of cycle involving these two skaters.
No need to say, the ISU-94 rule violates this more general principle.
It is hard to know whether the ISU was conscious of this fact but, with the new rule
put forward in 1998, the ISU abandoned the ﬁrst three criteria of the ISU-94 rule, including
( M R P ) ,a n dr e p l a c e dt h e mw i t hac r i t e r i o nt h a ti sas m a l lm o d i ﬁcation of a rule known
in the literature as the Copeland rule. It consists in ranking alternatives with respect to
the number of other alternatives that each alternative beats by a majority of votes or with
which they tie.2 This rule respects the Extended Condorcet Criterion. The Borda count is
still used as a second criterion, to break ties left by the Copeland rule. The combination of
these two criteria is all the more curious that the Copeland and the Borda rules may rank
candidates in reverse orders.
The diﬀerent tables that appear at the end of the paper show that the ISU-94 and ISU-98
rules may give very diﬀe r e n tr a n k i n g s .H a dt h eI S U - 9 4r u l es t i l lb e e ni nu s ea tt h eO l y m p i c
Games of 2002, it could have given rankings quite diﬀerent from the new rule then in use.3
For example, Table 11 shows that in the short program of the women competition, skater
labeled4 I would have obtained rank 9 instead of 11 while J would have obtained rank 10
instead of 8. In short, there are six inversions between the ISU-94 and the ISU-98 rankings
in the short program, one in the free program, and four in the ﬁnal ranking.5
Condorcet’s objective was to ﬁnd a most probable ranking on the set of alternatives.
He showed that the majority relation, whenever consistent, is this most probable ranking
under the hypothesis that every judge or voter can pick the best of two alternatives with
a probability greater than one half and that this judgment is independent between pairs of
alternatives and judges. If the majority relation produces cycles, some way must be found to
break them. The Copeland rule, which is the ﬁrst component of the ISU-98 rule, is one way
to do so while respecting (XCC). However, it does not necessarily provide a most probable
ranking on these subsets. Young (1988) shows that the Kemeny rule is the rule to use in
2Counting ties as wins is what makes the rule used by the ISU diﬀerent from the original Copeland rule.
3As an illustration of the ignorance concerning these rules, the CBS Sportline posted on its website for
the Olympic Games of 2002 the description of the 1994-rule.
4Names are replaced by labels.
5The ﬁnal ranking is now given by a weighted sum of the ranks obtained in the short program and the
free program, the latter receiving twice as much weight as the former.
3order to get a most probable ranking in the presence of cycles. We shall present this rule
and contrast it with the two ISU and the Borda rules.
Finding a Kemeny order by considering all possible permutations of the skaters, as the
deﬁnition suggests, may prove prohibitive when the number of competitors is large as in
ﬁgure skating. We show that the Copeland rule itself can be used to partition the skaters in
such a way that it suﬃce to ﬁnd Kemeny rankings within subsets of the partition that are
not singletons. Then, a complete Kemeny order is obtained by concatenating the Kemeny
rankings on the subsets of the partition.
It is also well known that there may exist many Kemeny orders. We propose the concept
of the mean Kemeny ranking, which when it exists, may obviate partially this problem.
T h et w oI S U ,t h eB o r d a ,a n dt h eK e m e n yr u l e sa r ei l l u s t r a t e dw i t he x a m p l e sa n dw i t h
the data of 30 Olympic competitions: men (M), women (W), and pairs (P), short and free
programs, for 1976, 1988, 1992, 1994, and 2002. A summary of these comparisons appears
in Tables 12 and 13. The measure of the disagreement between two rankings is the number
of pairs of competitors for which the relative ranks are inverted. For example, there are two
inversions between the orders cab and abc n a m e l yo n ef o rt h ep a i r{a,c} and another one for
the pair {b,c}. If two competitors obtain the same rank in one ranking and diﬀerent ranks
in another ranking, this is counted as half a diﬀerence. More details on the comparisons are
g i v e ni nt h ec o n c l u s i o n .
The last issue treated in this paper is manipulation, or the misrepresentation of one’s
true (preferred) ranking by a judge in order to change the ﬁnal ranking for one that he or she
prefers. For example, a judge may prefer rankings that favour a particular competitor. There
is a famous impossibility theorem in this context, due to Gibbard (1973) and Satthertwaite
(1975), which says that all social choice functions, i.e. functions that select a winner, are
manipulable. More generally, a judge may prefer a ranking to another, not just because
of the winner, but because of the whole ranking. Bossert and Storcken (1992) extend the
Gibbard-Satthertwaite theorem to this context, i.e. to social welfare functions or ranking
rules.
The ISU rules do not escape these theorems. This paper shows, by means of examples,
how the diﬀerent principles involved in these rules, including the Median Rank Principle,
are prone to manipulation. Some ranking rules may be more so than others. The question
is then whether or not the ISU rules do well in this respect. Some considerations on this
4matter are oﬀered, drawing on recent work by Saari (1990). It is argued that the Copeland
and especially the Kemeny rules require more sophistication in order to be manipulated.
However, the present state of research does not permit a clear-cut answer on this subject.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation including the formal
deﬁnitions of most rules considered in this paper. Section 3 examines these rules from the
perspective of properties that are often encountered in the theory of social choice. Section 4
describes the cycles of the majority relation found in the data of the 30 Olympic competitions.
The Kemeny rule is the object of section 5. Manipulability is taken up is section 6. A
summary of the paper and concluding remarks on the choice of a ranking rule are oﬀered in
section 7.
2D e ﬁnitions
Let X = {a,b,c,...} or X = {A,B,C,...} be the set of competitors, skaters or alternatives,
with cardinality |X| = m. The terms competitor, skater and alternative will be used inter-
changeably, depending on the context. The ﬁrst two are more appropriate to our context
while the term alternative is more usual in the theory of social choice. This term will often
be used when referring to this theory.
We denote by B the set of binary relations on X, by R the subset of complete weak
orders or rankings (reﬂexive and transitive binary relations) on X, and by L the subset
of linear orders (complete, transitive, and asymmetric binary relations) on X. Ac o m p l e t e
weak order on X can be represented in three diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst is given by a vector
r =( ra,r b,r c,...), where ra is the rank of a, rb the rank of b, and so on. Equivalently, a
weak order can be represented by an (m × m) binary matrix N =[ νst]s,t∈X where:
νst =
(
1 if s 6= t and rs ≤ rt
0 otherwise
Conversely, given a binary representation N of a weak order, we get the representation r
by setting rs = m −
Pm
t=1 νst. Note that νst = νts =1if and only if rs = rt. The third
representation is a sequence s1s2 ...,where s1 and s2 are the competitors with ranks 1 and
2 respectively, etc. Parentheses are used to identify competitors with the same rank, as in
ab(cde)fg. We shall use all three representations in this paper.
5To complete the description of the problem, there is a set J = {1,2,...,n} of voters or
judges. For each judge j, we have a ranking rj ∈ R, also called a vote,o nt h es e tX. A proﬁle
of votes is a vector R =( r1,...,rn) ∈ Rn. Ap r o ﬁle may also be given in the form of binary
matrices (N1,...,Nn). Once the voters or judges have cast their votes, the problem is to
aggregate these votes into a ﬁnal ranking. We formalize this idea in the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 1 An aggregation or ranking rule is a function Γ : Rn → R that assigns to each
proﬁle R, a ﬁnal ranking Γ(R) of the alternatives. Γs (R) represents the rank of alternative
s in the ﬁnal ranking Γ(R).
In the language of the theory of social choice, Γ is a social welfare function. Note that
some of the rules discussed in this paper are deﬁned in terms of the aggregate binary matrix:













In Figure Skating, the marks given by the judges to the competitors merely serve to
establish a ranking rj (ordinals) for each judge j. Then, an aggregation or ranking rule,
deﬁned by the International Skating Union (ISU), is applied to the proﬁle thus obtained to
arrive at a ﬁnal ranking. This rule has changed through time. We shall describe the rule in
use from at least 1982 until 1998 and the one by which it was replaced in 1998. The Borda
rule is a component of these two rules. A variant of the Copeland rule, which is also often
discussed in the literature on aggregation of votes, is a component of the new rule. As is
well known, the Borda rule is a scoring rule. Interestingly, the ﬁrst ISU rule can be seen
as an iterative application of successive positional or scoring rules with tie-breaking criteria.
Hence, we ﬁrst recall the deﬁnitions of the Borda and the Copeland rules and the deﬁnition
of scoring rules, before giving a deﬁnition of the two ISU rules.
2.1 The Borda and Other Scoring Rules
Borda (1784) presented his rule to the Académie des sciences de France, which used it
until Napoléon got elected to this institution. Given a proﬁle R, alternative s receives
b∗(s)=
Pn
j=1 (m − rj
s) points. This number is the Borda score of s. If the proﬁle is given













t=1 νst. With the Borda rule, alternatives are ordered inversely to their
Borda scores.
6Now, let us deﬁne b(s)=
Pn
j=1 rj
s. Clearly, b∗(s)=mn − b(s). Thus, alternatively, the





s=1 . Formally, we have the following deﬁnition.6
Deﬁnition 2 The Borda rule is the function B : Rn → R deﬁned by:
∀s,t ∈ X : Bs(R) ≤ Bt(R) ⇔ b(s) ≤ b(t) ⇔ b
∗(s) ≥ b
∗(t)
B (R) is the Borda ranking.
A scoring rule is one in which a vector of weights w =( w1,...,w m),w i t hwi ≥ wi+1,i=
1,...,m− 1,w 1 >w m =0 , is used to tally the ballots. Let ¯ ni (s)=|{j ∈ J : rj
s = i}| and
pw(s)=
Pm
i=1 ¯ ni (s)wi. The competitors are ranked according to numbers of points pw(s)
that they receive. The Borda rule is the scoring rule with w =( m − 1,m− 2,...,1,0).
Deﬁnition 3 The scoring rule with vector w is the function Pw : Rn → R deﬁned by:
∀s,t ∈ X : P
w
s (R) ≤ P
w
t (R) ⇔ p
w(s) ≥ p
w(t)
2.2 The Copeland Rule






1 if νst >ν ts
1
2 if νst = νts
0 otherwise





This number is the Copeland score of s. This is the number of alternatives over which s gets
a strict majority of votes plus half the number of alternatives with which it ties.7
6Formally, the numbers that have just been deﬁn e dd e p e n do nR. This is not indicated in the notation
for the sake of simplicity.
7Alternatively, the three numbers 1, 1
2,0 could be replaced by 2,1,−1, as in Moulin (1988).
7Deﬁnition 4 The Copeland rule is the function C : Rn → R deﬁned by:
∀s,t ∈ X : Cs(R) ≤ Ct(R) ⇔ c(s) ≥ c(t)
C(R) is the Copeland ranking.
2.3 The ISU-94 Rule
This rule, which has been used from at least 1982 until 1998, is described in rule 371 of the
International Skating Union Regulations of 1982 and 1994, reproduced in Appendix B. The
ISU-94 rule, as we call it, can be formally deﬁned as follows. Its deﬁnition involves four
principles or criteria. When a principle has been applied, the next one is used only if there
remain ties between some competitors.
The ﬁrst criterion is the median rank ρ(s) of each skater s, i.e. the smallest rank such
that a majority of judges have placed skater s at one of the ranks 1,...,ρ(s) (par.1, 2,
6)8. The smaller the median rank the better. If two skaters, say s and t, obtain the same
median rank, one tries to break the tie by reverting to the numbers of judges nρ (s) and
nρ (t) who gave the median or a better rank to s and t respectively (par.3). The more the
b e t t e r .I ft h i si sn o ts u ﬃcient to break all ties, one then tries to do so by using the sum of
ranks of tied skaters according to the judges who gave the median rank or a better rank to
these competitors (par.4). This number, for skater s, is written as nρ (s). The smaller the
better. If there still remains some ties after applying this third criterion, one uses the sum of
ranks given to s by all judges (par.5), or equivalently the Borda scores b(s), as a breaking
criterion. Finally, if all ties are not resolved after these four principles have been applied,
competitors who tie for a rank obtain the same rank (par.10).
Formally, these criteria are deﬁned as follows. First, let:
Ji (s)={j ∈ J : rj
s ≤ i}, and ni (s)=|Ji (s)|
Then, ρ(s)= m i n
i∈{1,...,m}
i such that ni (s) >
|J|
2 ,
Next, for the sake of simplicity, we write Jρ (s)=Jρ(s) (s) and nρ (s)=nρ(s) (s)









8These are the paragraphs of the regulations translated in this criteria.




is the mean rank of skater s while
bρ(s)
nρ(s)
is the mean rank of skater s according to
the judges of Jρ (s). Now, for each candidate s ∈ X, deﬁne the vector U(s) ∈ R4 by
U(s)=( ρ(s),n − nρ(s),b ρ(s),b (s))
and let ≤  be the lexicographic weak order9 on R4. We can now give the deﬁnition of the
ISU-94 rule.
Deﬁnition 5 The ISU-94 rule is the function ISU94 : Rn → R deﬁned by:
∀s,t ∈ X : ISU
94
s (R) ≤ ISU
94
t (R) ⇔ U(s) ≤  U(t)
ISU94(R) is the ISU-94 ranking.
Note that if U(s)=U(t) for some s and t,t h e ns and t obtain the same rank. The left
panel of Table 1 illustrates the computation of the four criteria of this rule. See also the
tables starting on page 47 for additional illustrations. The left part of the panel in these
tables gives the proﬁle, i.e. the rankings of the judges, indexed from 1 to 5 or 7. The ranking
resulting from the application of the four criteria is given in the third panel. More details
on reading these tables are given at the end of the next subsection.
Remark 1 The ISU-94 rule can also been described as an iterative procedure, where a
scoring rule is applied at each iteration. This will prove useful when examining the strate-
gic aspects of this rule. The scoring rule used at iteration i<mis deﬁned by wi =
(
i times z }| {
1,...,1,
m−i times z }| {
0,...,0) . This is an approval rule. Skaters s : pwi(s) > n
2 who have not been
ranked in the previous iterations are given the rank Pwi
s (R). Ties in this ranking are then
broken whenever possible, by using the scoring rule with w =( m − 1,m− 2,...,1,0) ﬁrst
on the subset of judges Jρ (s) and if necessary, over the whole set of judges. Note that
P
i∈Jρ(s) ¯ ni (s)wi = mnρ(s)−bρ(s). In the last iteration, the skater left obtains the last rank.
There can be at most one skater left at this stage.
This iterative procedure is illustrated in the middle panel of Table 1. At iteration 1, none
of the skaters is ranked since all numbers pw1(s) are smaller than 5
2. At iteration 2, skaters A
9Let us ﬁrst deﬁne <  . For a,b ∈ RL,a <   b if ∃k ∈ {1,...,L} : ak <b k and al = bl ∀l<k .
Then, a ≤  b if either a = b or a<   b. The reader can check that ≤  is transitive.
9and B are ranked ﬁrst and second respectively. At iteration 3, no additional skater is ranked.
At iteration 4, skaters D and E tie for the third place. However, since bρ (C) <b ρ (D), C
obtains the third rank and D the fourth.10 In the last iteration, there remains only E, who
gets the last rank.
Proﬁle Criteria-94
s 12345ρn ρ bρ b
A 1212225 8 8
B 2132124 6 9
C 542434 4 13 18
D 334544 4 14 19
E 455155 5 21 20
Iteration
s 12345
A 2 5 555











Table 1: Illustration of the ISU-94 rule
2.4 The ISU-98 Rule
This rule represents an important simpliﬁcation with respect to the previous one. It also
incorporates a diﬀerent majority principle as we shall see later. Now, skaters are ﬁrst ranked
according to the numbers of other skaters that they defeat according to a majority of judges,
or with whom they tie. The Borda rule is once again used to break ties according to the
ﬁrst criterion.11
Formally, the rule is based on a slight modiﬁcation of the Copeland rule obtained by
replacing the number 1
2 in the deﬁnition of µst by 1. T h u s ,at i ei sg i v e nt h es a m ew e i g h t
as a win. We shall denote the corresponding scores and rule by c∗ and C∗ respectively. Let
V (s)=( c∗(s),b ∗(s)). The formal deﬁnition of the ISU-98 rule is the following.12
Deﬁnition 6 The ISU-98 rule is the function ISU98 : Rn → R deﬁned by:
∀s,t ∈ X : ISU
98
s (R) ≤ ISU
98
t (R) ⇔ V (s) ≥  V (t)
ISU98(R) is the ISU-98 ranking.
10Note that Jρ(C)={2,3,4,5} and Jρ(C)={1,2,3,5}.
11This combination of the Copeland and the Borda rules is all the more curious that they may rank
candidates in reverse orders. See Straﬃn (1980) and Moulin (1988, Exercice 9.1).
12The new rule is described and illustrated in Communication No. 997 of the ISU, available on the web
site www.isu.org.
10In plain words, skaters are ﬁrst ranked according to their Copeland scores c∗(s).I ft w o
skaters, say s and t, obtain the same Copeland score, one tries to break the tie by comparing
the Borda scores b∗(s) and b∗(t). Finally, if all ties are not resolved after the application of
these two criteria, i.e. if V (s)=V (t) for some s and t, competitors who tie for a rank obtain
the same rank. Table 2 illustrates the application of this rule. Note that we use the binary
matrix N(R) as the starting point since we can easily compute the number of wins under










s ABCDE c∗ b∗
A 04454 41 7
B 40653 31 8
C 42055 31 6
D 33305 11 4








Table 2: Illustration of the ISU-98 rule
Remark 2 T h ee x a m p l eo fT a b l e2h a sb e e nc h o s e no np u r p o s e .I ts h o w st h a tC∗ may be
diﬀerent from C. Indeed, c =( 2 .5,2.5,2.5,1,1.5) and C(R)=( 1 ,1,1,5,4) while C∗(R)=
(1,2,2,5,4). Had c been chosen instead of c∗ in the deﬁnition of ISU98, the ﬁnal rank-
ing would have been (2,1,3,5,4) instead of (1,2,3,5,4). Moreover, as will be explained in
Remark 6, C∗ does not have all the properties of C.
Yet, in most practical situations, C and C∗ will be identical. The discrepancy between
C∗ and C in the example of Table 2 is due to the fact that A ties with three other skaters
while B has only one tie. We have not found similar situations in the other examples of
this paper and in the data of Olympic competitions. In this paper, we shall not distinguish
between the original Copeland rule and its modiﬁed version, except when necessary. The
context will indicate whether an aﬃrmation applies to the original rule, its modiﬁed version,
or both.
The tables starting on page 47 give other illustrations of the two ISU rules, and of the
Borda and the Kemeny rule, to be deﬁned in section 5. In particular, the modiﬁed proﬁle of
Table 7 illustrates the extent to which the two ISU rules may be diﬀerent. Noteworthy, they
may gives rankings that are very diﬀerent from the Borda ranking despite the fact that the
11B o r d ar u l ei sac o m p o n e n to fb o t h .T h ew i n n e ra c c o r d i n gt ot h eB o r d ar u l ei sr a n k e dl a s t
by the ISU-94 rule13 and fourth by the ISU-98 rule.14
The fourth panel of each part of the tables gives a measure of the disagreements between
rankings. This measure is the Kemeny metric to be also deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n5 .I np l a i nw o r d s ,
this metric is the number of pairs of competitors for which the relative ranks are inverted.
For example, there are two inversions between the orders cab and abc, namely one for the
pair {a,c} and another one for the pair {b,c}. If two competitors obtain the same rank in
one ranking and diﬀerent ranks in another ranking, this is counted as half a diﬀerence.
3 Properties of Ranking Rules
In the theory of social choice, properties are often imposed on ranking rules or stated as
desirable. The most famous are probably the four axioms originally deﬁned by Arrow (1951).
Their deﬁnitions are adapted to the context of ﬁgure skating in the ﬁrst subsection below.
The second subsection deals with two majority principles.
3.1 Arrow’s Conditions
Binary Independence (BI) Ar a n k i n gr u l eΓ satisﬁes binary independence15 if, given
two proﬁles R and ˜ R and two skaters s and t such that
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13This is hardly surprising since the ISU-94 rule is a combination or scoring rules. We know from Fishburn
(1981) that given two vectors of weights w and w0, there exists a proﬁle such that the scoring rule Pw gives
an order, say s1s2 ···sm, while Pw0
gives the reverse order smsm−1 ···s1. Actually, Benoit (1992) ﬁnds
the ranking of the baseball players, in the vote for the Most Valuable Player, to be quite sensitive to the
particular weights. Saari (1992) has more striking theoretical results.
14This also comes as no surprise. As pointed out in footnote 11, the Borda and the Copeland rules can
rank candidates in reverse orders. We also know from Saari and Merlin (1996) that the Borda and the
Copeland rankings can be as diﬀerent as desired when there are at least ﬁve candidates.
15This property is often called independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA).
12Weak Pareto Principle (WP) Ar a n k i n gr u l eΓ satisﬁes this principle if, given two





t ∀j ∈ J ⇒ Γs(R) < Γt(R)
Non-Dictatorship (ND) Ar a n k i n gr u l eΓ satisﬁes this condition if there exists no j ∈ J
such that Γ(R)=rj ∀R.
Monotonicity (M) Ar a n k i n gr u l eΓ satisﬁes monotonicity if, given two proﬁles R and ˜ R
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u ≤ ˜ r
j
v ∀j ∈ J, ∀u,v 6= s
the following holds:


















(BI) says that only the relative rankings of two skaters should matter in establishing the
ﬁnal relative ranking of these two skaters. (WP) says that if all judges are unanimous on the
relative rankings of two skaters, the ﬁnal relative ranking of these two skaters should agree
with the unanimous view of the judges. (ND) prescribes that no judge be able to impose his
or her ranking as the ﬁnal ranking in all circumstances. (M) says that if all judges were to
maintain or improve the relative ranking of skater s with respect to other skaters without
changing the relative ranking of all other skaters, then the ﬁnal ranking of skater s should
remain at least as good as it was before the change.
The syntax of the premise of (M) is the one usually found in the literature. See, for
instance, Arrow (1951) or Moulin (1988). However, the following lemma provides a diﬀerent
formulation that will be more convenient for the proof of Theorem 5.










v ⇔ ˜ r
j
u ≤ ˜ r
j
v ∀j ∈ J, ∀u,v 6= s




v ⇔ ˜ rj
u ≤ ˜ rj
v ∀u,v 6= s, we must have ˜ rj
v ≥ rj
v ∀v 6= s.
Hence, rj
s <r j
v ⇒ ˜ rj
s < ˜ rj
v and rj
s = rj
v ⇒ ˜ rj
s ≤ ˜ rj
v ∀v 6= s. Conversely, suppose that the
premise of (M) holds but that ˜ rj
s >r j
s for some j. Then, ∃v ∈ X : rj
s ≤ rj
v and ˜ rj
s > ˜ rj
v, a
contradiction.
Lemma 2 Given a proﬁle R a n daj u d g ei, the numbers ρ(s),n − nρ (s),b ρ (s),b (s),
deﬁned in connection with the ISU-94 ranking rule, are non-decreasing with respect to ri
s.
The numbers c(s),c ∗(s),b ∗(s), deﬁned in connection with the Copeland and the ISU-98
ranking rules, are non-increasing with respect to ri
s. Thus, a ranking based on any of these
numbers satisﬁes (M).
Proof. The ﬁrst two assertions are immediate. As for the last assertion, consider two
proﬁles R and ˜ R and two skaters s and t such that ˜ rj
s ≤ rj




t ∀j ∈ J. Suppose that
ρ(s) <ρ (t) under R. Then, clearly ˜ ρ(s) < ˜ ρ(t) under ˜ R, as requested by (M). Similarly,
ρ(s)=ρ(t) implies ˜ ρ(s) ≤ ˜ ρ(t). The same holds for all other numbers, with reversed
inequalities for the last three.
Theorem 3 The Borda, the Copeland, the ISU-94, and the ISU-98 rules satisfy (ND),
(WP), and (M).
Proof. This assertion follows from the deﬁnitions of the rules and Lemma 2.
Corollary 4 None of the Borda, the Copeland, the ISU-94, and the ISU-98 rules satisﬁes
(BI).
Proof. This follows from Theorem 3 and the impossibility theorem of Arrow (1951),
which says that there is no ranking rule that satisﬁes (BI), (ND), (WP) and (M).
The non-binary character of the aforementioned rules is immediate from their deﬁnitions.
In establishing the ranking between two alternatives, the ranks of other alternatives or the
majority of these two alternatives in comparison to other alternatives play a crucial role.
Actually, it is not hard to ﬁnd examples of violation of (BI). Hence, in Table 8, judge 5
changes her ranking to give the modiﬁed proﬁle. In doing so, she does not change her
relative ranking of A and B. Yet, this changes permits B to ravish the ﬁrst place to A
according to the Borda, the ISU-94, and the ISU-98 rules, in violation of (BI). In Table 9,
we have a violation of (BI) by the Copeland rule and again by the Borda and the ISU-98
rules. In this example, judge 3 changes her ranking to give the modiﬁed proﬁle. In doing so,
14she does not change her relative ranking of A and B. Yet, as in the previous example, this
changes permits B to ravish the ﬁrst place to A according to the Copeland, the Borda and
the ISU-98 rules. In particular, A defeats all other candidates under the majority rule with
the original proﬁles but defeats only two candidates with the modiﬁed proﬁle.
3.2 Majority Principles
Bassett and Persky (1994) point out that the ﬁrst criterion of the ISU-94 rule, which they call
the Median Rank Principle (MRP), translates a majority principle, which they call the Rank
Majority Principle (RMP). We now give their formal deﬁnition of this principle, followed by
their characterization of (MRP) in terms of (RMP) and (M).
Rank Majority Principle (RMP) Recall the deﬁnition ¯ ni (s)=|{j ∈ J : rj
s = i}|. A
ranking rule Γ satisﬁes this principle if, given a proﬁle R, two skaters s and t, and two ranks
i and k such that ¯ ni (s) > n
2, ¯ nk(t) > n
2,i<k ,one has Γs(R) < Γt(R). In plain words,
if skaters s and t obtain a strict majority for exactly rank i and k respectively, with i<k ,
then s should obtain a ﬁnal lower rank than t.
Theorem 5 (Bassett and Persky) An aggregation rule Γ : Rn → R satisﬁes (M) and
(RMP) if and only if
∀s,t ∈ X : Γs(R) ≤ Γt(R) ⇔ ρ(s) ≤ ρ(t) (MRP)
Proof. The “only if” part is immediate. Conversely, suppose that (M) and (RMP)
hold but that (MRP) fails, i.e. ∃R ∈ Rn,s , t∈ X, and positive integers i,k such that
i = ρs(R) <ρ t(R)=k but Γs(R) ≥ Γt(R). Then, consider another proﬁle ˆ R such that
rj
s ≤ i ⇒ ˆ rj
s = i (which implies rj
s ≤ ˆ rj
s) ∀j ∈ J, and rj
u ≤ rj
v ⇔ ˆ rj
u ≤ ˆ rj
v ∀j ∈ J, ∀u,v 6= s.








⇒ Γs(R) < Γt(R) or equivalently:









Next, consider a proﬁle ˜ R such that ˆ r
j
t ≥ k ⇒ ˜ r
j
t = k ∀j ∈ J, and ˜ rj
u ≤ ˜ rj
v ⇔ ˆ rj
u ≤ ˆ rj
v ∀j ∈


















15Combining (1) and (2), we get:








However, with proﬁle ˜ R, we now have ¯ ni (s) > n
2 and ¯ nk(t) > n










Remark 3 BP states their monotonicity condition with the premise: given two proﬁles R
and ˜ R and two skaters s and t such that ˜ rj
s ≤ rj




t ∀j ∈ J. They omit the part
rj
u ≤ rj
v ⇔ ˜ rj
u ≤ ˜ rj
v ∀j ∈ J, ∀u,v 6= s, given in Lemma 1. Their deﬁnition is thus the one of
strong monotonicity (SM) given in subsection 6.1. As will be seen in subsection 6.1, (MRP)
does not satisfy (SM). Actually, BP implicitly use (M) in the proof of their theorem, instead
of (SM), which is ﬁne.
Remark 4 (RMP) almost characterizes (MRP) since most interesting rules satisfy (M).
However, (RMP) alone does not provide a complete ranking. Thus, (RMP) alone does not
imply (MRP).
As pointed out by BP, (RMP) is by no means the only majority principle of interest in
this context. Condorcet advocated another principle, which says that if in a head to head
comparison, a majority of judges give a better rank to skater s than to skater t, then s
should obtain a better ﬁnal rank than t. Accordingly, skaters should be ranked on the basis
of these head to head comparisons. This idea leads to the deﬁnition of the correspondence
M : Rn → B:
sM(R) t ⇔ νst >ν ts
The binary relation M(R) is the majority relation issued from proﬁle R. As is well known,
this relation is not necessarily transitive: it may contain cycles, a term to be made precise
below. Thus, M is not an aggregation rule. Yet, if M(R) is a linear order on X,w ec a l li t
the Condorcet ranking.A na l t e r n a t i v es such that sM(R) t ∀t 6= s is a Condorcet winner.
Note that there may exist a Condorcet winner even if there is no Condorcet ranking. To
complicate the problem, in the context of ﬁgure skating where ties are allowed, M(R) is not
necessarily complete. This problem will be remedied in the next section by extending M(R)
to the weak majority relation.
16Although M is not necessarily an aggregation rule, it is often considered as desirable that
an aggregation rule gives a result that agrees with the Condorcet ranking whenever possible.
This prompt the following deﬁnition.
Condorcet Consistency (CC) An aggregation rule Γ : Rn → R is Condorcet consistent
if Γ(R)=M(R) for every proﬁle R such that M(R) is a linear order.
Theorem 6 The Copeland rule and the ISU-98 ranking rule satisfy (CC).
Proof. Consider a sequence s1,s 2,...,s m and a proﬁle R such that νs1 >ν s2 > ···>ν sm.
Then, c(s1) >c (s2) > ··· >c (sm) and thus, C(R) is a singleton satisfying Cs1(R) <
Cs2(R) < ···<C sm(R) as requested by (CC). Since there is no tie, ISU98(R)=C∗(R)=
C(R), establishing that the ISU-98 rule satisﬁes (CC).
Remark 5 The Borda rule may violate (CC). This possibility has been known since the
lifetime of Borda and Condorcet, who debated passionately over the respective merits of
their rules. In as much as the Borda rule is a component of the ISU-94 rule, the latter
does not respect (CC) either. However, (MRP), i.e. the ﬁrst criterion of the ISU-94 rule,
may itself be at odds with (CC). The original proﬁle of Table 9 provides an illustration of
ac o n ﬂict between (MRP) and (CC). Skater B is ranked ﬁrst according to (MRP) but she
should be ranked second according to (CC).
Remark 6 Henriet (1985) characterizes the Copeland rule in terms of three properties. The
modiﬁed Copeland rule violates two of these properties, namely a monotonicity condition
stronger than (M) and the independence of the ranking with respect to the reversal of cycles
in the majority relation. See Appendix A for the details.
4 Cycles in Olympic Competitions
A cycle of the majority relation M(R) is a subset of X, say {s1,...,s κ} such that:
s1M(R)s2M(R)···M(R)sκM(R)s1
With both proﬁles of Table 7, there is a cycle of M on the whole set X. This possibility was
well known by Condorcet himself and for this reason, is often called the Condorcet paradox.
17The literature contains numerous analyses of the theoretical probability of the occurrence
of cycles. Gerhlein (2002) provides an excellent survey of many of theses analyses for the
case of three alternatives. In his words, “models have been developed which attempt to
determine these probability estimates for situations which are contrived to make the out-
come most likely to occur. In general, intuition suggests that we would be most likely to
observe this paradox on the pairwise majority rule relations when voters’ preferences are
closest to being balanced between all pairs of candidates.” This notion of balanced prefer-
ences is given diﬀerent forms in the literature. One of them is Impartial Anonymous Culture
(IAC). With (IAC), it is assumed that all preference proﬁles, for a ﬁxed number of voters,
are equally likely to be observed. A second assumption is Maximal Culture (MC). It diﬀers
from (IAC) in not requiring that there is a ﬁxed number of voters in the population. An-
other assumption is Impartial Culture (IC), in which each voter independently selects his
preference type according to a uniform probability distribution. A fourth assumption is the
Dual Culture Condition (DC) under which “each possible ranking has the same probability
of being observed as its reversed, or dual, ranking.”
For the case of nine voters, as in Figure Skating, these diﬀerent assumptions produce
probabilities of a cycle on three alternatives that range between 0.056 and 0.17. However,
in his conclusion, Gerhlein makes clear that the probability of a cycle would certainly be
signiﬁcantly lower “for typical situations that are not contrived to make majority rule cycles
most likely to occur.” He adds: “Given all of this, if we wonder whether or not majority rule
cycles should be expected to be routinely observed in three-candidate elections, the answer
is clearly ‘No.’
In Figure Skating, judges are supposed to make an impartial evaluation of the competi-
tors. Thus, their rankings should be close to one another (positively correlated). They
should be far from being balanced according to the diﬀerent deﬁnitions given in the previous
paragraphs, diminishing if not eliminating the possibility of cycles. It was thus a surprise to
ﬁnd out as many as 19 cycles, i.e. cycles on 19 disjoint subsets of skaters, in the data of 30
Olympic competitions.
Many of the cycles found in Olympic competitions involve some ties between skaters.
Thus, in order to examine the data of Olympic competitions, we must extend the majority
relation to take the possibility of ties into account.
18Competition Set Cycle Rel.
M-1976, short {3,4,5,6,7,9} 4T3M5T7T9M6T4 W
4T3M7T5M9M6T4 W
4T3M7M9T5M6T4 W
M-1976, free {6,7,8} 7M6M8T7 W
M-1988, short {5,6,7} 6M5M7T6 W
{12,13,14} 12M13M14M12 M
{20,21,22} 20M22M21T20 W
M-1992, short {14,15,16} 14M16T15T14 W
M-1992, free {4,5,6,7,8} 4M7M8M5M6T4 W
{5,6,7,8} 5M6M7M8M5 M
{12,13,14} 12M13M14T12 W
W-1988, short {12,...,20} 15T13M14M12M20T16M18M19M17M15 W
13M17T14M12M20T16M18M19M15T13 W
W-1992, short {7,8,9} 8M7M9T8 W
{18,19,21} 19M21M18T19 W
W-1992, free {16,17,18} 16M17M18T16 W
W-1994, short {8,9,10} 8M10M9T8 W
{17,18,19,20} 17M18M19M17 M
W-2002, short {6,7,8,9,10,11} 6M7M8M11M9M10M6 M
{20,21,22} 20M22M21M20 M
P-1976, short {10,11,12,13} 10M12M13M11M10 M
P-2002, short {13,14,15} 13M14M15M13 M
Table 3: Cycles in 12 Olympic Competitions












Accordingly, a cycle of W(R) is a subset of X, say {s1,...,s κ} such that
s1W(R)s2W(R)···W(R)sκW(R)s1












Ac y c l eo fT(R) is a subset of X, say {s1,...,s κ} such that all elements tie. Note that M is
the asymmetric component of W and T its symmetric component.
As explained above, we found cycles of W(R) in 12 of the 30 Olympic competitions that
we examined. In some cases, there are cycles on two or three disjoint subsets, for a total
of 19 subsets.16 These cycles are described in Table 3. We sometimes list more than one
cycle for a particular subset. However, we do not pretend to be exhaustive in this respect.
The last column indicates which relation, M or W, is involved in the cycle. The names of
the competitors are replaced by the numbers corresponding to their ISU-94 ranking in the
competition under scrutiny, with ties broken in an arbitrary way.
Let us single out a few facts from Table 3. Most cycles involve middle ranked skaters,
as if the disagreements between the judges occur mainly for these competitors. However, in
one case these were famous skaters. In another case, one of the skaters in the cycle actually
obtained the third place in the ISU-94 ranking. These cycles never prevented the occurrence
of a Condorcet winner, except in the 1992 and 1994 women free programs, where two skaters
tied for this title.
In the men 1976 short program, the skater ranked ninth by the ISU-94 rule ties with the
skater ranked ﬁfth according to the majority rule. The skater ranked ninth by the ISU-94
rule also defeats the skater ranked sixth. In the women 1988 short program, a majority of
judges has given a better rank to skater 19 than to skater 15 while the ISU-94 rule has ranked
them not only in the reverse order but four ranks apart. We found the longest cycle of W
(9 skaters) in the women 1988 short program and the longest cycle of M (6 skaters) in the
16We do not include cycles of T in this count. The latter will show up as ties in the Kemeny rankings.
20women 2002 short program. Most cycles were found in the short programs. Paradoxically,
the short program is supposed to be the most objective part of a competition.
5T h e K e m e n y R u l e
In our opinion, Condorcet Consistency is more compelling than the Rank Majority Principle,
which together with Monotonicity characterizes the Median Rank Principle. Indeed, it is
hard to resist to the principle requiring that the ranking between two skaters reﬂect the
view of a majority of judges whenever possible, i.e. when this can be done in a consistent
way. Actually, there is a much more profound foundation to this criterion, due to Condorcet
(1785). More important, Condorcet’s approach can be extended to deal with cycles in the
majority relation. The result is the Kemeny rule.
5.1 Condorcet’s Maximum Likelihood Approach
Condorcet’s objective was to justify the majority principle. On this, he was certainly inspired
by Rousseau (1762) in his Social Contract, for whom the opinion of the majority is legitimate
because it expresses the “general will.”
When in the popular assembly a law is proposed, what the people is asked
is not exactly whether it approves or rejects the proposal, but whether it is in
conformity with the general will, which is their will. Each man, in giving his
vote, states his opinion on that point; and the general will is found by counting
votes. When therefore the opinion that is contrary to my own prevails, this
proves neither more nor less that I was mistaken, and that what I thought to be
the general will was not so. [Rousseau (1913), p.93]
Condorcet’s objective was to formulate this proposition rigorously, using the calculus
of probability, which was new at the time of his writing. In the context of ﬁgure skating,
his approach may be cast as follows. There is a best skater, in terms of the performance
being assessed, a second best, etc. Put diﬀerently, there is a true or objective order of the
skaters, base on their performances. Judges may have diﬀerent opinions because they are
imperfect observers. Some details of the performances, quick as they can be, may escape
them. However, if they are right more often than they are wrong, then the opinion of the
majority should yield the true order of the skaters.
21In ﬁgure skating, this is a legitimate point of view since the intent of the ISU regulations
is clearly to have judges furnish an evaluation of the relative merits of the competitors in
terms of scores. They are even instructed on how to subtract points for diﬀerent types of
mistakes. The diﬀerent scores attributed to the diﬀerent elements of the competition are
then aggregated and the ranking rj of each judge is determined from these aggregated scores.
Thus, the proﬁle R is supposed to contains these evaluations and not the preferences of the
judges. The recent scandals that have aﬄi c t e dt h i ss p o r ta n dt h eﬁndings of Campbell and
Galbraith (1996), on which we shall come back, may cast doubt on this presumption. Yet,
if we take the rankings of a proﬁle R as independent evaluations of the true ranking of the
competitors according to the established rules, a pertinent question is: which ﬁnal ranking
Γ(R) is most likely to be the true ranking of the competitors?
Assuming that every judge can pick the best of two skaters with a probability p satisfying
1/2 <p≤ 1, and that this judgment is independent between pairs of skaters and judges,17
Condorcet showed that if the binary relation M is an order on X, then it is the most probable
order on X. This was one of the ﬁrst applications of maximum likelihood estimation and of
statistical hypothesis testing.
Condorcet also proposed a method for breaking cycles. His prescription is to eliminate
some of the propositions (sMt is a proposition), starting with the one with the weakest
majority and so on until the cycle disappears. This works ﬁne if m =3but unfortunately
this method may give ambiguous results or a partial order for larger values of m. Young
(1988) develops a correct application of Condorcet’s maximum likelihood approach for the
more general case. He shows that a most likely order is in fact a Kemeny order, i.e. an order
that minimizes a “distance” between an order r an a proﬁle R proposed by Kemeny (1959)
and Kemeny and Snell (1962), hence the name given to this rule. Note that the Copeland
rule, which is used as the ﬁrst criterion in the ISU-98 rule, is another method to deal with
cycles while respecting (CC). However, it departs from Condorcet’s maximum likelihood
approach.
17Drissi and Truchon (2004) relax the assumption that this probability is the same for all pairs of alter-
natives. Other authors have relaxed the assumption that it is the same for all voters.
225.2 Deﬁnition of the Rule
The deﬁnition of the rule involves the Kemeny “distance” between a weak order and a proﬁle.
First, let γst : R2 → R be a function deﬁned for every pair of alternatives (s,t) such that
s<tand every pair of weak orders (ˆ r,r) by:
γst (ˆ r,r)=

    
    
1 if ˆ rs < ˆ rt and rs >r t
1
2 if ˆ rs < ˆ rt and rs = rt
1
2 if ˆ rs =ˆ rt and rs >r t
0 otherwise







γst (ˆ r,r) (3)
Finally, the Kemeny “distance” δ









Deﬁnition 7 The Kemeny rule is the correspondence18 K : Rn → R that assigns to each
proﬁle R, the subset K(R)=a r gm i n r∈R δ
K(R). The elements of K(R) are Kemeny rankings.
The value of δ
K(R) may be seen as the total number of pairwise supports for r in proﬁle
R, i.e. the total number of judges who rank pairs of skaters as in r. A maximum likelihood
order is thus one that has the greatest total support from the judges.
5.3 Results on Kemeny Orders
Given that there may be ties in the majority relation, the search for a Kemeny ranking
should ideally be done in the space of weak orders. However, the space of weak orders being
considerably larger than the space of linear orders, we shall limit the search to linear orders.
Yet, as we shall see below, we do not abandon weak orders completely. With this provision








18Contrary to the rules previously deﬁned, we now have a correspondence instead of a single value function.
23We call κ(r,R) the Kemeny score of order r. If the rows and the columns of N(R) are
ordered according to the vector r, then, κ(r,R) is the sum of the elements above the diagonal
of N(R). Actually, κ(R) is a positive transformation of the maximum likelihood function.
Hence, a Kemeny order has the maximum Kemeny score. This is established in the following
lemma.
Lemma 7 argminr∈L δ
K(R) = argmaxr∈L κ(R)
Proof. Let τst(R)=




¯ ¯ and note that νst(R)=




¯ ¯.I fr is a



























































τst(R) is common to all orders r, whether rs <r t or
rs >r t. Indeed, if rs >r t, then τst(R) is replaced by τts(R) in this term but both have the
same value. Thus, minimizing δ
K (r,R) is equivalent to maximizing κ(r,R).
Lemma 8 Let X = {1,2,...,m} and suppose rK =( 1 ,2,...,m) is a Kemeny order for a
given proﬁle R. Then, νs,s+1(R) ≥ νs+1,s(R),s =1 ,...,m− 1.
Proof. If this was not the case for some s, one could obtain an order with a better
Kemeny score by simply interchanging the ranks of s and s +1 .
5.4 Finding Kemeny Orders
Finding a Kemeny order by considering all possible permutations of the skaters, as the
deﬁnition suggests, may prove prohibitive when the number of competitors is large as in
ﬁgure skating. There are many contributions in the literature that address this speciﬁc
24problem.19 Whatever the method used, one way to ease the task it to break the problem
into many subproblems, using an extension of Condorcet Consistency that we shall rightly
call the Extended Condorcet Criterion. In essence, it says that if the set of alternatives
can be partitioned in such a way that all members of a subset of this partition defeat all
alternatives belonging to subsets with a higher index, then the former should obtain a better
rank than the latter. For most practical applications, a Kemeny order on each subset of the
partition can be found by simple enumeration. Then, a complete Kemeny order is obtained
by juxtaposing the Kemeny orders on the subsets of the partition.
Extended Condorcet Criterion (XCC) Let X ={X1,X 2,...,X p} be a partition of X
such that:
α<β ,s∈ Xα,t∈ Xβ ⇒ νst >ν ts
A partition satisfying the above property is called a Condorcet partition.L e tP (X) be the
class of all Condorcet partitions of X.
T h e n ,a na g g r e g a t i o nr u l e 20 Γ : Rn → R satisﬁes the Extended Condorcet criterion
(XCC) if for any selection γ(R) ∈ Γs(R) and any partition X ∈P (X), the following holds:
[α<β ,s∈ Xα,t∈ Xβ] ⇒ γs(R) <γ t(R)
(XCC) implies (CC). Indeed, if M(R) is a linear order, then the ﬁnest Condorcet partition
of X is a set of singletons. Thus, Γ(R)=M(R) as requested by (CC).
If there is a cycle of W on some subset of alternatives, then these alternatives must
belong to a same subset Xα of any Condorcet partition of X. In particular, this must be the
case for two alternatives s and t such that sTt.I nt h eﬁnest partition of this class, the sets
Xα are cycles of maximal length of W (possibly a set of tied skaters) or singletons. X1 is
also called the top cycle of W or the Condorcet set, a solution concept introduced by Good
(1971) and Schwartz (1972) for the strict majority relation. X2 i st h et o pc y c l eo nX\X1,
etc. Xp is sometimes called the bottom cycle.
When W(R) contains cycles, (XCC) does not say how to rank alternatives within an Xα.
In other words, (XCC) yields only a partial order in these circumstances. The Kemeny rule
19Several of these contributions are based on mathematical programming. See for instance Remage and
Thompson (1966), de Cani (1969), Marcotorchino and Michaud (1979), Barthelemy, Guénoche, and Hudry
(1989).
20Γ is now a correspondence.
25can then be used to complete a partial order yielded by (XCC). We explain how below, after
proving a few more results.
The Condorcet partition is by no means new. Laslier (1997) uses the same kind of
decomposition in the context of tournaments, which are deﬁn e db ya na s y m m e t r i ca n d
complete binary relation on a set of alternatives. He calls the ﬁnest partition of P (X) a
scaling decomposition. He proves that such a decomposition is unique. Laslier also gives
many references where this idea can be found. Depending on the authors, the subsets of this
partition are called adjacent sets, convex parts, autonomous parts, etc. One ﬁnds the same
kind of decomposition in Saari and Merlin (2000), whose concern is closer to ours, namely
the study of Kemeny orders. They call the subsets of a partition “layers”. However, most
of these authors rule out the possibility of ties in the majority relation and no one seems
to have made an explicit use of such a partition to ﬁnd a Kemeny order on the set of all
alternatives.
Corollary 9 (to Lemma 8) The Kemeny rule satisﬁes (XCC).
Proof. Given a proﬁle R, suppose that rK is Kemeny order that violates (XCC), i.e.
there exists a partition X ∈P (X),X α,X β ∈ X with α<β ,and s ∈ Xα,t∈ Xβ such that
rK
t <r K
s . By deﬁnition of P (X),w em u s th a v esMt. Thus, by Lemma 8, s cannot be the
immediate successor of t in the Kemeny order. Thus, there must exist other alternatives,
say a,...,k, between t and s in this Kemeny order. Using Lemma 8 again, we must have
tMaM...MkMs.S i n c ew ea l s oh a v esMt, there is a cycle of M on the set {t,a,...,b,s}.
Using the deﬁnition of P (X) again, {t,a,...,b,s} should belong to the same subset of the
partition X.W et h u sh a v eac o n t r a d i c t i o ns i n c e ,a tt h eo u t s e t ,s and t belonged to diﬀerent
Xα and Xβ.
Lemma 10 The Copeland rule satisﬁes (XCC).
Proof. Given a proﬁle R and a partition X ∈P (X), take any s ∈ X and suppose
it belongs to Xα ∈ X.F o r a n y u ∈ X that belongs to some Xβ ∈ X with α<β ,we
have by deﬁnition of P (X), νsu >ν us. Thus, given two alternatives s and t such that
s ∈ Xα,t∈ Xβ with α<β ,alternative s defeats more other alternatives than t. This implies
c∗(s)=c(s) >c (t)=c∗(t) and by deﬁnition,C ∗
s(R)=Cs(R) <C t(R)=C∗
t (R) as requested
by (XCC).
26Remark 7 Since a Kemeny and a Copeland rankings both satisfy (XCC), they must agree
on all singletons of the ﬁnest partition of P (X). However, they may order elements of the
subsets Xα that are not singletons in quite diﬀerent ways. As an illustration, with the
original proﬁle of Table 7, for which there is a cycle on the whole set X, the Copeland
ranking is C∗(R)=C(R)=( 1 ,2,2,4,4,6), i.e. the weak order A(BC)(DE)F, while the
unique Kemeny ranking is rK =( 2 ,3,4,5,1,6), i.e. the order EABCDF. Note also that
C∗ and C may disagree on subsets of the ﬁnest partition of P (X) that are not singletons.
According to the proof of 10, they may disagree only on these subsets.21
Remark 8 According to Lemma 10, given a partition {X1,X 2,...,X h,...,X p}∈P (X),
the elements of X1 are the competitors with the ﬁrst |X1| ranks in C(R) or C∗(R),22 the
elements of X2 are the next |X2| competitors in this ranking and so on. In particular, if
Xh = {h}, then the rank of h in a ranking satisfying (XCC) is |X1| + |X2| + ···+ |Xh−1|.
Now, let ˆ C(R) be the Copeland ranking with ties broken in such a way that the condition of
Lemma 8 is satisﬁed on each subset of tied skaters.23 Then, the ﬁnest partition of P (X) can
be found by examining each competitor in turn in the order given by ˆ C(R). Suppose that
the subsets X1,X 2,...,X h have already been identiﬁed as the ﬁrst elements of the partition
and let s be the next alternative according to ˆ C(R). If νst >ν ts ∀t : ˆ Cs(R) < ˆ Ct(R),24 then
Xh+1 = {s} and the rank of s in any Kemeny order is the same as in ˆ C(R).O t h e r w i s e ,
let t∗ be the alternative with the smallest rank ˆ Ct∗(R) such that νut >ν tu ∀t>t ∗ and
∀u : s ≤ u ≤ t∗. Then, Xh+1 =
n
u ∈ X : ˆ Cs(R) ≤ ˆ Cu(R) ≤ ˆ Ct∗(R)
o
. Once this partition
found, there merely remains to ﬁnd a Kemeny ranking xα (in the form of a sequence) on
each subset Xα of the partition that is not a singleton. Juxtaposing these orders gives a
complete ranking x1x2 ···xp on X. The next result asserts that this ranking is a complete
Kemeny order on X.
Theorem 11 Given a proﬁle R, take any partition X ={X1,X 2,...,X p}∈P (X) and the
sequence x1x2 ···xp, where xα is a Kemeny order on Xα under proﬁle R restricted to Xα,α=
1,...,p.T h e nx∗, or equivalently the corresponding r∗(x∗), is a Kemeny order on X.
21I nt h ee x a m p l eo fT a b l e2w h e r eC∗ and C disagree, there is a cycle of W (R) on the whole set X.
22According to the previous remark, it does not matter which of C(R) or C∗(R) is used here.
23This can be done easily by ﬁnding a Kemeny order on the set of tied skaters.
24Alternatively, if c(s)=c∗ (s)=m − ˆ Cs (R).
27Proof. Contrary to the assertion, suppose that x∗ is not a Kemeny order on X but that
x is. Then, x cannot be diﬀerent from x∗ in respect only to alternatives that belong to the
same Xα since this would violate the assumption that xα is a Kemeny order on Xα.T h u s ,
there exist Xα,X β ∈ X with α<β ,and s ∈ Xα,t ∈ Xβ such that rt(x) ≤ rs(x) instead
of rs(x) <r t(x) as with x∗. By Corollary 9, r cannot be a Kemeny order since (XCC) is
violated.
Theorem 11 is akin to Theorem 6 in Saari and Merlin (1997), which says that, in any
Kemeny order and for any α and β,a l t e r n a t i v e sf r o mXα are strictly ranked above alter-
natives from Xβ when α<β ,and that dropping an alternative from Xα has no eﬀect on
the ranking within Xβ,β6= α. Our theorem is somewhat stronger in that it applies to any
Condorcet partition and not just to the ﬁnest of these partitions. Moreover, it allows for ties
in the majority relation.
This approach can be illustrated with the short program of the women 2002-Olympic
competition. Using the Copeland rule and the method described in Remark 8, we ﬁnd the
ﬁnest partition of P (X):{ { A } ,{ B } ,{ C } ,{ D } ,{ E } ,{ F ,G ,H ,I ,J ,K } ,{ L } ,{ M } ,{ N } ,
{O}, {P}, {Q}, {R}, {S}, {T, U, V}, {W}, {X}, {Y}, {Z}, {ZZ}}.25 There is a cycle of the
majority relation M on the subset {F, G, H, I, J, K}, namely FM GM HM IM JM KM F
and the cycle TM VM UM T on {T, U, V}. There are 6!, i.e.120, possible orders on the
subset {F, G, H, I, J, K}. However, using Lemma 8, one can eliminate all orders involving
two successive alternatives s and t such that νst <ν ts. This leaves 31 orders of which we list
10 in Table 4, together with their values κ(·,R FGHIJK) where RFGHIJK is the restriction of R
t ot h es e t{ F ,G ,H ,I ,J ,K } .T h e r ea r et h u sf o u rK e m e n yo r d e r so nt h es u b s e t{ F ,G ,H ,I ,
J, K}. In the case of the subset {T, U, V}, there are two Kemeny orders, UTV and TVU.
The next subsection deals with the multiplicity of Kemeny orders.
25The Copeland Rule gives rank 7 to G and H, 9 to I and J, and 20 to T, U, and V. However, νGH >ν HG
and νIJ >ν JI. Calling the Kemeny routine on these two sets returns GH and IJ as the Condorcet rankings
on these two pairs. On the subset {T, U, V}, the routine just says that there is indeed a cycle and two












Table 4: Ten orders satisfying Lemma 8
5.5 The Mean Kemeny Ranking
The Kemeny rule may yield more than one order. This occurrence can sometimes be resolved
by reverting to the concept of the mean Kemeny ranking. Given a set of Kemeny orders
©
ˆ r1,...,ˆ rkª
, consider the weak order ˜ r deﬁned by:











This weak order is a ranking according to the mean ranks of alternatives over all Kemeny








∀s,t ∈ X :ˆ r
q
s < ˆ r
q
t ⇒ ˜ rs ≤ ˜ rt
The ranking ˜ r represents a compromise between the Kemeny orders. Thus, its choice
makes sense, at least when it weakly agrees with one Kemeny order. There is a mean
Kemeny order on the subset {F, G, H, I, J, K} of the women 2002 Olympic competition.
This is the fourth Kemeny order FGHIJK.
There may be instances where the mean Kemeny ranking may fail to exist, i.e. where ˜ r
disagrees with all Kemeny orders. This is the case on the subset {T, U, V} of the women
2002 Olympic competition. There are two Kemeny orders on this subset, UTV and TVU.
29The order corresponding to ˜ r is TUV. It disagrees with both Kemeny orders. Thus, choosing
˜ r in this case would be inconsistent with the Condorcet-Kemeny-Young approach since this
order is less probable than any Kemeny order.
In such a case, a Kemeny order can be chosen at random or according to some other
criterion. For example, the Kemeny order closest (according to the Kemeny metric) to the
Copeland or to the Borda ranking could be chosen. In the case of the subset {T, U, V},
the two orders UTV and TVU have the same distance from the Borda order TUV and from
the Copeland ranking. The second order has been chosen for no particular reason. The
concatenation of TVU and of FGHIJK with the singletons in the ﬁnest Condorcet partition
of X (or, equivalently with the rank given by the Copeland rule on these singletons) yields
the complete Kemeny order of Table 11 on p. 51.
According to the deﬁnition of the mean Kemeny ranking, if all competitors of a set Xα
in the partition tie for a rank, then they will be declared ex aequo according to ˜ r.I n d e e d ,
all permutations of the elements of Xα are Kemeny orders on this set. Taking the mean of
the ranks of each competitor in Xα over all Kemeny orders yield the same number for each.
Declaring these competitors ex aequo makes sense since all Kemeny orders on this set are
equally probable.26
There are other instances in which some competitors could be declared ex aequo. In
the original proﬁle of Table 7, if judge 3 were to interchange her ranking of C and F, there
would then be three Kemeny orders: EABFCD, EABDFC, and EABCDF. This means that
CDF, DFC and FCD have the same likelihood. Not surprisingly, with this change, there is
ac y c l eC M DM FM Co nt h es e t{C,D,F}. There is good ground here to declare these
three competitors ex aequo since they have the same likelihood of being in any of the last
three positions and this is what happens with ˜ r.
The second proﬁle of Table 7 provides another example of multiple Kemeny orders. There
are six Kemeny orders: EADFBC, EADBCF, EABCDF, DFEABC, DEAFBC, DEABCF.
Here, ˜ r does not agree weakly with any of the Kemeny orders. Thus, there is no mean
Kemeny ranking. The third one has been chosen for the simple reason that it happens to be
the unique Kemeny order with the original proﬁle.






is diminished when r is changed into a weak order by giving s and t t h es a m er a n k .
30Interestingly, in this case, the Borda ranking is (4,2,6,2,1,4). Thus, B and D tie for the
second rank and A and F tie for the fourth rank. Moreover, only one point in the Borda
scores separates adjacent ranks, thus conﬁrming the close competition between all skaters.
The ISU-94 ranking in this case is (1,2,4,3,6,5), completely at odds with the Borda and
with the six Kemeny orders.
5.6 Properties of the Kemeny Rule
It is easy to check that the Kemeny rule satisﬁes (ND), (WP), and (M). Thus, by Arrow’s
theorem, it does not satisfy (BI). In the original proﬁle of Table 7, if A and B had not
shown up for the competition or equivalently if all the judges had ranked them in the last
two places without changing the marks of all other competitors, then the unique Kemeny
and Condorcet order would become CDFE. Hence E would become the Condorcet loser, in
violation of (BI). This is also a violation of strong monotonicity (SM) deﬁned in the next
section.
However, Young and Levenglick (1978) show that the Kemeny rule satisﬁes a weaker
independence condition that they call local independence of irrelevant alternatives (LIIA).
Its deﬁnition involves the concept of interval for orders. An interval for an order is any subset
of alternatives that occurs in succession in that order. For example, abcd,bcd,bc,cd,cde are
intervals of the order abcde. (LIIA) requires that the ranking of alternatives within any
interval be unaﬀected by the presence of alternatives outside this interval. This condition
implies that the ranking of alternatives toward the top of the list is unaﬀected by the removal
of those at the bottom, etc.
The Kemeny rule is also symmetric (S) (it puts all judges on an equal footing), neutral
(N) (it treats all skaters in the same way). Moreover, it satisﬁes reinforcement (R) (whenever
two distinct groups of judges both reach the same ranking of the skaters, this ranking is also
the consensus for the two groups of judges merged together). The Borda rule and more
general scoring methods also satisfy these properties but the Kemeny rule is the only one to
satisfy (LIIA) as well.
With the original proﬁle of Table 7, if B was dropped from the list, then C would move
ahead of A in the Borda ranking. Given that the Borda rule is a component of both the
ISU-94 and the ISU-98 rules, none of them satisﬁes (LIIA). Actually, the (MRP) and the
Copeland rule themselves may violate (LIIA). With the original proﬁle of Table 10, we have
31the vector ρ =( 2 ,3,4,3,5). Were we to remove D and E from X, we would get ρ =( 2 ,1,3)
for the set {A,B,C}, in violation of (LIIA). As for the Copeland rule, with the removal of
B from the original proﬁle of Table 7, A and C tie for the ﬁrst place while A defeats C under
the original proﬁle. A more probing example is given at the end of Appendix A.
6 On the Manipulability
Although judges are supposed to be as objective as possible in assessing the performance of
skaters, it is in the human nature no to be always so. In their empirical study of the results
of 24 Olympic competitions, Campbell and Galbraith (1996) ﬁnd strong evidence of the
presence of a small national bias, the latter being more marked for medal contenders than
for less strong competitors. Actually, such biases are easily detected by a quick look at the
rankings of the judges. In addition, a notorious fact at least since the 2002 Olympic Games,
sophistication may go as far as involving some logrolling between two or more competitions.
Manipulation refers to strategic behavior (insincere voting) rather than to biased voting,
which is usually sincere. A judge may report a ranking diﬀerent from his or her preferred one
in order to change the ﬁnal ranking for one that he or she prefers. This is what manipulation
is about. This is diﬀerent from biased voting, say in favour of a fellow skater.
A judge might be interested only in the winner of a competition and could thus try to
manipulate the ranking procedure with this objective in mind. We could then see the ranking
procedure as a social choice function, i.e. a function that selects a winner. There is another
famous impossibility theorem in this context, proved independently by Gibbard (1973) and
Satthertwaite (1975), which says that all non-dictatorial (ND) social choice functions are
manipulable. There is a strong link between these impossibility results and the one of
Arrow.
More generally, a judge may prefer a ranking to another one, not just because of the
winner, but because of the whole ranking. One way to formalize this preference is to use the
Kemeny metric between two rankings. The smaller the Kemeny distance between a ranking
and the preferred ranking of a judge, the better. Bossert and Storcken (1992) extend the
Gibbard-Satthertwaite theorem to this context. Thus, it appears that all rules considered in
this paper are manipulable. To get a better picture of the situation, let us turn to another
monotonicity condition.
326.1 Strong Monotonicity and Manipulation
Muller and Satthertwaite (1977) establish that a social choice function is not manipulable
if and only if it satisﬁes a strong monotonicity condition. We shall deﬁne this condition
and show that it is violated by the Copeland, the Borda, the ISU-94, the ISU-98, and the
Kemeny rules. Hence, these rules are all manipulable.
Strong Monotonicity (SM): Ar a n k i n gr u l eΓ satisﬁes strong monotonicity if, given two
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(SM) has the same premise as (M) except that the relative ranking of skaters other
than s are not required to remain the same. Both have the same conclusion. In Remark
3, it has been pointed out that BP gave the deﬁnition of (SM) instead of (M), although
they used the latter in their characterization of (MRP) (Theorem 5). This may explain why
they labeled their condition “incentive compatibility” and why they contended that “Median
ranks provide strong safeguard against manipulation by a minority of judges.”
The example of Table 10 provides a violation of (SM) by (MRP) and hence by the ISU-
94 rule. In this example, judge 4 changes his ranking. Despite the fact that he gives A a
better rank in the modiﬁed proﬁle, the latter looses her ﬁrst rank to the proﬁto fB ,w h o
obviously also gets a push from the part of judge 4.27 Note that the ﬁnal ranking of A
and B under the ISU-94 rule depends on (MRP) alone with both proﬁl e s .A c c o r d i n gt ot h e
Muller-Satthertwaite theorem, (MRP) is thus manipulable. In our opinion, this principle
and the ISU-94 rule are actually quite prone to manipulation, more so than the other rules
considered in this paper, including the ISU-98 rule.
27This example also illustrates the violation of (BI). The ﬁnal ranking of A relative to B is inverted despite
the fact that judge 4 has not changed his relative ranking of these two skaters.
33This is not to say that the latter are not manipulable. In the example of Table 9, judge
3, by changing his ranking from BACEDF to BCEDAF, permits his favorite candidate B
to ravish the ﬁrst rank to A according to B,K,C, and ISU98.28 Another example, given
in Table 8, illustrates the manipulation of B, ISU94, and ISU98 again. Here, by changing
her ranking from BACDE to BCDAE, judge 5 is able to make B the winner instead of A,
according to B, ISU94 and ISU98.29
6.2 On the Ease of Manipulation
There are many aspects to manipulation:
• Some ranking rules may be more prone to manipulation than others in that there exist
more proﬁles for which manipulation can be successful.
• The impact of manipulation in terms of the ﬁnal results may be more or less important.
• Some ranking rules may require more sophistication than others in order to be manip-
ulated successfully. In some cases, manipulation by individuals or small groups may
be possible. In other cases, manipulation may require large coalitions.
An analysis of manipulation requires combining these three aspects. Let us give a brief
look at the rules discussed in this paper in this respect.
The Borda Rul e
This rule has been considered as highly manipulable for a long time. Many authors have
constructed examples showing that a coordinated action by many voters may have a dramatic
impact on the ﬁnal Borda ranking. Already in the 19th Century, the French mathematician
Laplace (1812) pointed out that even honest voters could be tempted to give the last ranks
to the strongest candidates in order to favour their own candidate. This, in his opinion,
would give a great advantage to mediocre candidates. He added that, for this reason, this
28We have c∗ =( 5 ,4,3,2,1,0) with the ﬁrst proﬁle and c∗ =( 2 ,4,4,3,2,0) with the second proﬁle. Thus,
with the second proﬁle, B would tie with C for the ﬁrst rank under C. Under ISU-98, C is the unique winner,
thanks to the Borda criterion. By reporting {5,1,3,4,2,6} instead of {5,1,2,4,3,6}, judge 3 could make
sure that C is the unique winner under C alone.
29With the original proﬁle, A is the winner thanks to the second criterion. With the modiﬁed proﬁle, B
becomes the winner, thanks to the fourth criterion.
34rule had been abandoned by institutions that had previously adopted it. Borda’s answer is
well known: “My method should be used only with honest people.”
Saari (1990) develops a measure of susceptibility to manipulation for scoring voting pro-
cedures. He shows that, at least for m =3 , it is the Borda rule for which manipulation
can have the largest expected strategic impact. His study is done under the following as-
sumptions. It is equally likely for any pair of alternatives to be the target of a manipulation
attempt; all proﬁles of rankings are equally likely; and it is equally likely that a strategic
voter or a small coalition of strategic voters has any particular ranking.
However, his most surprising ﬁnding is that, among all scoring voting procedures, the
Borda rule is the method that either minimizes, or comes close to minimizing, the likelihood
of a successful manipulation by a small group of individuals (say less than 5). This result is
essentially due to the ﬁxed value for the successive diﬀerences between the weights wi used
in the Borda method. However, this same property makes this rule vulnerable to carefully
coordinated manipulation by large groups.
The ISU- 94 Rul e
Depending on the proﬁle, this rule can be manipulated via any of its four criteria. However,
as seen in Remark 1, the ISU-94 rule is the combination of many scoring procedures. Among
them are those deﬁned by the weight vectors (1,0,...,0) and (1,1,...,1,0), which deﬁne the
plurality and the anti-plurality rules respectively. According to Saari (1990), these are the
two scoring rules that are the most susceptible of being manipulated by a small coalition,
i.e. the ones for which there exist more proﬁles that can be manipulated successfully.
The ISU-94 rule being a combination of many procedures that are susceptible to manip-
ulation, is it more or less susceptible to manipulation than any of its components? There
is probably no clear cut answer to this question. On the one hand, the fact that manipula-
tion within a scoring procedure may imply the recourse to a diﬀerent one may reduce the
opportunities for manipulation within the ﬁrst procedure. On the other hand, this same
fact may open additional possibilities to the manipulators. Do these additional possibilities
compensate for the lost ones? The answer probably depends on the circumstances. How-
ever, in as much as the Borda rule is rarely used in this context, it is safe to assert that the
performance of the whole ISU-94 rule cannot be as good as that of the Borda rule in terms
of susceptibility to manipulation.
35The Cop e l a nd, t he ISU- 98, and t he Kemeny Rul es
The Copeland and the Kemeny rules satisfy (XCC). This puts a heavy burden on those who
wish to manipulate these rules. Indeed, suppose that the original proﬁle yields a linear order
as the majority relation M(R). If a judge or a subset of judges are unable to introduce a
cycle in this relation by reporting diﬀerent rankings, then they are unable to manipulate the
ﬁnal ranking in the sense of their preferences. Under these circumstances, the best way for
these judges to make sure that the ﬁnal ranking resembles their own ranking is to report the
latter. This applies also to the ISU-98 rule since in this case, it would be identical to the
Copeland rule.
Thus, in order for a subset of judges to be able to manipulate these rules successfully,
there must be a cycle in M(R) under the original proﬁle or they must be able to produce a
cycle by altering their rankings. In the ﬁr s tc a s e ,t h e yw o u l dh a v et ob ea w a r eo ft h ep r e s e n c e
of this cycle before hand. In the second case, their strategic behavior, to be successful, should
in addition to producing a cycle, yield a ranking preferable to the ﬁnal ranking that would
be obtained otherwise. Moreover, manipulation would be successful, if at all, only on those
subsets of the ﬁnest partition of P (X) that are not singletons.
The example of Table 9 shows that the kind of sophistication described above is possible.
In this example, there is a Condorcet order, which is also both a unique Copeland and
Kemeny order. By changing his preference, judge 3 alone is able to produce the cycle
BCDEAB and force a change in both the Copeland and the Kemeny rankings so that his
favorite candidate is now the winner under both rules.30
Whether the Kemeny rule is more or less susceptible to manipulation than the ISU-94,
the ISU-98, or any scoring rule seems to remain an open question. However, the fact that
it involves complex computations as compared to the other rules certainly makes it more
diﬃcult to manipulate. Moreover, the fact that it satisﬁes the local independence condition
also limits the possibilities of its manipulation.
In an attempt to diminish cheating and manipulation, the ISU is now experimenting with
a new system in which there is a larger number of judges but the results of only a fraction of
them, chosen at random, are retained.31 This new system will not prevent manipulation but
30Ex aequo with C under C. By reporting {5,1,3,4,2,6} instead of {5,1,2,4,3,6}, judge 3 could make
sure that C is the unique winner under both rules.
31With a minimum of 8 judges, 5 are drawn to form the result, with a minimum of 10 judges 7 are drawn
at random, and with a minimum of 12 up to 14 judges, 9 are drawn to form the result.
36it will make it more diﬃcult and render its success less likely. Moreover, this new system will
not prevent judges from reporting biases scores in favour of their fellow competitors. In as
much as the score now remain anonymous, this new system may provide judges with more
latitude to report extravagant scores.32
7 Conclusion
We may wonder whether the prescription of a new rule by the ISU may have a real impact
in real competitions and whether the use of a diﬀerent rule such as the Kemeny or the Borda
rule could produce signiﬁcantly diﬀerent rankings. Merlin, Tataru, and Valognes (2000) give
interesting indications on these questions. They estimated the probability that all Condorcet
consistent rules, all scoring rules, and a large family of runoﬀ rules elect the same candidate
in a three-candidates election to be around 0.5, under the Impartial Culture (IC) condition
deﬁned at the beginning of section 4. This probability falls to less than 0.02 on the set of
proﬁles yielding a cycle of the majority relation. We should also expect it to fall with more
candidates. However, the requirement that a very large set of rules yield the same result is
very strong.
In real life, things could be very diﬀerent. Hence, Levin and Nalebuﬀ (1995), using data
from 30 British Union elections, ﬁnd that many diﬀerent electoral systems would not have
given diﬀerent top choices. The systems diﬀered in the ranking of the lower candidates. They
suggest that, when voters’ preferences are suﬃciently similar, a variety of voting systems lead
to similar choices, and these choices have desirable properties. The diﬃculties in aggregating
preferences would arise when there is a lack of consensus. In this case, the choice of an
electoral system can make the greatest diﬀerence.
To dig further into this question, we have applied the two ISU, the Borda, and the
Kemeny rules to the data of 30 Olympic competitions: men (M), women (W), and pairs (P),
short and free programs, for 1976, 1988, 1992, 1994, and 2002. The results are summarized
in Tables 12 and 13 by the measure of the disagreement between the rankings as given by
the Kemeny metric cK.33
32This kind of behavior has been observed the ﬁrst time that the new system has been put on trial at a
Skate Canada competition held in Québec City in the fall 2002.
33We recall that the ﬁnal ranking is given by a weighted sum of the ranks obtained in the short program
and the free program, the latter receiving twice as much weight as the former. We have not done that kind
37They show that the choice of a rule can have a real impact on the results. Many dis-
a g r e e m e n t sh a v eb e e nf o u n db e t w e e nt h et w oI S U ,t h eB o r d a ,a n dt h eK e m e n yr a n k i n g s . 34
Many of the diﬀerences occur for middle places, as in the comparisons reported by Levin
and Nalebuﬀ (1995). Yet, disagreements for these places may be important for the skaters
concerned since participation in future competitions may depend on being ranked in the ﬁrst
ten places or so. In one case, the ISU-94 rule gives a fourth place while the Kemeny rule
gives a third place. In two instances, the Kemeny rule gives a tie for the ﬁrst rank instead
of ranks 1 and 2. In one instance, it gives a tie for the second place instead of ranks 2 and
3. Finally, in four instances, it gives a tie for the third place instead of ranks 3 and 4. The
diﬀerences between the Kemeny and the ISU-98 rankings are essentially due to the presence
of cycles in the majority relation, of which many occurrences have been found. The latter
are thus not only a theoretical possibility.
The choice of a particular ranking rule should be based on its properties. While the
ISU-94 puts forward a majority principle as the basis of its ranking rule, this principle is at
odds with the usual Condorcet criterion, which says that if a competitor is ranked ahead
of all other competitors by an absolute majority of judges, he should be ﬁrst in the ﬁnal
ranking. The ISU-94 rule also conﬂicts with an extension of this principle to other ranks,
which goes as follows: If a competitor is ranked consistently ahead of another competitor by
an absolute majority of judges, he or she should be ahead in the ﬁnal ranking. Consistency
refers to the absence of cycle involving these two skaters. The ISU-98 rule represents an
improvement in this respect since its ﬁrst criterion is the Copeland rule, which satisﬁes this
Extended Condorcet Criterion.
This criterion may give a complete ranking of all competitors in ideal circumstances. In
the case of cycles, an additional criterion is however needed to break cycles while retaining
Condorcet’s objective, which was to ﬁnd a ranking with the highest probability of being the
true ranking. The Copeland rule incorporates a way of breaking these cycles. However, if
we stick to Condorcet’s objective, the Kemeny rule is a better choice to break these cycles.
of weighted sum with the rules other than the ISU rules. Hence, for the ﬁnal rankings (both programs),
there is only one number, showing the discrepancy between the two ISU rules.
34In the case of multiple Kemeny orders, the mean Kemeny order was chosen when it existed. Otherwise,
the Kemeny order closest to the Copeland ranking was chosen so as to minimize the disagreement with the
ISU-98 ranking.
38Young (1995) advocates this rule for social decision purposes. Le Breton and Truchon
(1997) propose a measure of how far from the Borda rule a social choice function may
be. They ﬁnd that the Kemeny rule fares best, as compared to other rules satisfying the
Condorcet criterion. With 20 skaters and 9 judges, it does almost twice as better as the
Copeland rule.
Another alternative would be to use uniquely the Borda rule. The latter has much to
command for itself. It is a scoring rule, which satisﬁes interesting requirements such as an-
other reinforcement condition (diﬀerent from the one deﬁn e di nS e c t i o n7 )a n dp a r t i c i p a t i o n .
The ﬁrst one says that, if two distinct panels of judges select the same winner, then the joint
panel should also select this winner. Participation means that if an additional judge suc-
ceeds in changing the winner, it can only be in the sense that he or she favours. There is no
Condorcet consistent rule, such as the Kemeny rule, that satisﬁes these two requirements.
The reader is referred to Young (1974) or Moulin (1988) for more details on these rules.
Based on the ﬁndings of Saari (1990), the Borda rule also appears to be less susceptible to
manipulation by a minority of judges than the ISU-94 rule. Manipulation by a large coalition
of judges is not really an issue in rating skating. However, the ISU-98 rule and especially
the Kemeny rule may be more diﬃcult to manipulate than the Borda rule.
As stressed in this paper, the ranking procedures used in ﬁgure skating are deﬁned on
the domain of ordinal rankings provided by the judges. Is there a good theoretical basis for
throwing away the raw marks of the judges and retaining only the relative rankings drawn
from the marks? In a Monte Carlo experiment, BP contrast the ISU-94 rule with a method
that consists in summing the raw marks of the judges. They start with true marks for all
competitors that result in a complete ranking, the true ranking. The marks of each judge
are then obtained by adding a random term to the true marks, truncating the result at 6.0.
With true marks ranging from 4.8 to 5.8, they ﬁnd that the ISU-94 rule outperforms the
simple addition of the raw marks in picking the true winner (54% of the time versus 46%).
BP’s simulations suggest that neglecting part of the information may play an important
role in smoothing out errors in the judges’ marks. We might also think of a role for this
procedure in reducing the scope for manipulation. However, both contentions would need a
ﬁrmer theoretical justiﬁcation.
39Appendices
A Characterization of the Copeland Rule
The Copeland rule has been deﬁned in terms of the binary matrix N(R). We might as well
have deﬁned the rule in terms of the weak majority relation W(R) deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n4 .
Actually, we may abstract from R completely and deﬁne the rule in terms of any binary
relation W on X, with M and T as the asymmetric and the symmetric components of W.
With some abuse of notation, we shall deﬁne µst(W), Γ(W), and C (W).
Let µst : B → R, be a function deﬁned for every pair of alternatives (s,t) and every














Then, the Copeland rule is the function C : B → R deﬁned by:
∀s,t ∈ X : Cs(W) ≤ Ct(W) ⇔ c(s) ≥ c(t)
C(W) is the Copeland ranking.
Henriet (1985) has given a characterization of the Copeland rule in terms of three properties.
Neutrality (N) Let σ(X) be a permutation of the elements of X and given a binary
relation W on X, let Wσ be the binary relation on X deﬁned by sWσt ⇔ σ−1(s)Wσ−1(t).
Then, a ranking rule Γ : B → R is neutral (N) if ∀σ(X), ∀s,t : Γs(Wσ)=Γσ−1(s) (W).
In plain words, interchanging alternatives in X with the proper change in W should bring
the same interchange of ranks in the ﬁnal ranking.
Positive Responsiveness (PR) Ar a n k i n gr u l eΓ : B → R satisﬁes Positive Responsive-
ness if, given two binary relations W and ˜ W and two skaters s and t such that
∃u ∈ X :[ uMs and s˜ Tu] or [sTu and s ˜ Mu]
∀u,v 6= s,t : uWv ⇔ u ˜ Wv
then,








40In plain words, if W and ˜ W are identical except that alternative s gets an improved
position with respect to some alternative u in ˜ W then, s gets a better rank than t under ˜ W
if this was so under W and she gets also a better (improved) rank than t if she tied with t
under W.
(PR) is stronger than (M) in two respects. Its premise is stronger than the premise of




without all the judges maintaining or improving the relative ranking of skater s with respect
to other skaters while maintaining the relative ranking of all other skaters. Moreover, (PR)
requires that s gets an improved rank with respect to t under ˜ W if she tied with t under
W.35
Independence from reversals of cycles (IRC) Suppose that W and ˜ W are two binary
r e l a t i o n st h a ta r ei d e n t i c a le x c e p tt h a ti ft h e r ei sac y c l eo fW(R) say {s1,...,s κ}, then
the same cycle also appears in ˜ W but its order is reversed. More precisely, for each sk ∈
{s1,...,s κ}
skMsk+1 ⇒ sk+1 ˜ Tsk
skTs k+1 ⇒ sk+1 ˜ Msk





(N) is a very mild condition that is satisﬁed by all rules discussed in this paper. It is easy
to check that the original Copeland rule satisﬁes (PR) and (IRC). In the case of (IRC), there
are four possible patterns concerning the relation of sk with sk−1 and sk+1. They are listed
below. Let γ (sk) be the contribution of a particular pattern to c(sk). It can be checked
that in each case, γ (sk) remains the same when going from W to ˜ W. Since W and ˜ W are
identical except for the reversal of the cycle, this means that c(sk) remains the same when
going from W to ˜ W.
W ˜ W γ (sk)
sk−1MskMsk+1 sk+1 ˜ Tsk ˜ Tsk−1 1
sk−1TskMsk+1 sk+1 ˜ Msk ˜ Ts k−1 1.5
sk−1MskTsk+1 sk+1 ˜ Tsk ˜ Msk−1 0.5
sk−1Ts kTsk+1 sk+1 ˜ Msk ˜ Msk−1 1.0
Theorem 12 (Henriet) The Copeland rule C : B → R is the only ranking rule that satis-
ﬁes simultaneously (N), (PR), and (IRC).
35Monotonicity as deﬁned in section 3 is often called Non-Negative Responsiveness. The Strong Monotonic-
ity deﬁned in section 6.1 is actually called Strong Positive Association by Muller and Satterthwaite. The
strength of their condition comes from the fact that the rankings of alternatives other than s and t are not
required to remain the same.
41It is easy to see that the modiﬁed Copeland rule used in the ISU-98 rule does not satisfy
(IRC). Indeed, with W, we have γ∗ (sk)=1 ,2,1,2 for the four respective patterns listed
above. With ˜ W,we have γ∗ (sk)=2 ,1,2,1. Thus, c∗(sk) may change when a cycle implying
sk is reversed.
The modiﬁed Copeland rule does not satisfy (PR) either. To see this, consider the
two binary matrices of Table 5. They deﬁne two binary relations W1 (left panel) and W2
(right panel). By a theorem of McGarvey (1953), there exists proﬁles R1 and R2 such that
W1 = W(R1) and W2 = W(R2). The only change when going from W1 to W2 is that the
tie between B and D is broken in favour of B. To meet (PR), this push for B should break













Table 5: Example showing the violation of (PR) by the modiﬁed Copeland rule
Since the Borda, the Kemeny and the two ISU rules use more information than simply the
relation W(R), they do not satisfy (PR) and (IRC). The premises of these two conditions
could be satisﬁed with all kinds of changes in the proﬁles that could trigger changes in the
rankings contrary to the conclusions of (PR) and (IRC).
To conclude this appendix, we give another example showing that the original and the
modiﬁed Copeland rules do not satisfy (LIIA). Consider the binary matrix of Table 6, which
deﬁnes a complete strict majority relation M on X = {A, B, C, D, E, F}. It yields the
ranking C = C∗ =( 2 ,1,4,4,4,2). Removing E and F from X, we get C = C∗ =( 1 ,2,3,4),








Table 6: Example showing the violation of (LIIA) by the Copeland rule
42B Rule 371 of the ISU (1982 and 1994)
Determination of results of each part of a competition
1. The competitor36 placed ﬁrst by the absolute majority of Judges in a part of the
competition is ﬁrst; he who is placed second or better by an absolute majority is
second and so on.
2. For this purpose, the place numbers 1 and 2 count as second place; place numbers 1,
2 and 3 count as third place, and so on.
3. If two or more competitors have obtained a majority for the same place, the ﬁrst among
them is he who has been so placed by the greater number of Judges.
4. If such majorities are equal, then the lowest total of place numbers of those Judges
forming the majority determines between them.
5. If the total of the place number is equal according to paragraph 4, the sum of the place
numbers of all Judges determines the result; if this is also equal the competitors are
tied.
6. If there is no absolute majority for a place, the result for such place must be ascertained
by seeking the best majority for the following place; and if there is no such majority
then by seeking the best majority for the next following place and so on.
7. If such majorities are equal under paragraph 6, the systems referred to in paragraphs
4 and 5 must be applied.
8. The ascertainment of each place must ﬁrst be made in accordance with paragraphs
1 through 5, and thereafter according to paragraphs 6 and 7 in the above mentioned
order.
9. a) If two or more competitors are temporarily tied with majorities for the same place,
the place must be awarded to one of those competitors on the basis of paragraphs 3,
4 and 5. After awarding the place, the remaining temporarily tied competitor(s) must
be awarded the next following place(s) on the basis of paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 without
considering any additional competitors.
b) In awarding the subsequent places thereafter, the unplaced competitors with a
majority for the lowest numbered place shall be given ﬁrst consideration.
10. If the foregoing rules fail to determine the award of any place, then the competitors
tied for that place must be announced as tied. If two competitors so tie for ﬁrst place,
the next place to be awarded is third place (not second). If two skaters so tie for second
place, the next place to be awarded is fourth place (not third) and so on.
36The rule always adds “or the team” after “competitor”. This has been omitted to simplify the text.
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46Original Proﬁle
Proﬁle Criteria-94
s 1234567ρn ρ bρ b
A 222666124 72 5
B 33311163 6 12 18
C 44444424 7 26 26
D 55633233 4 11 27
E 11155555 7 23 23
F 66522344 4 11 28
Binary matrix Criteria-98
s ABCDEF c∗ b∗
A 044414 41 7
B 306636 32 4
C 310444 31 6
D 313044 21 5
E 643303 21 9
F 313340 11 4














s 1234567 ρn ρ bρ b
A 222666124 72 5
B 33333363 6 18 24
C 44444424 7 26 26
D 556122334 82 4
E 11155555 7 23 23
F 665211444 82 5
Binary matrix Criteria-98
s ABCDEF c∗ b∗
A 044414 41 7
B 306333 11 8
C 310444 31 6
D 343044 31 8
E 643303 21 9
F 343340 21 7












Table 7: Example with a cycle, illustrating the diﬀerence between four rules
47Original Proﬁle
Proﬁle Criteria-94
s 12345ρn ρ bρ b
A 1212225 8 8
B 2132124 6 9
C 442434 5 17 17
D 334544 4 14 19
E 555155 5 21 21
Binary matrix Criteria-98
s ABCDE c∗ b∗
A 03554 41 7

















s 12345 ρn ρ bρ b
A 1212424 61 0
B 2132124 6 9
C 442424 5 16 16
D 3345333 91 8
E 555155 5 21 21
Binary matrix Criteria-98
s ABCDE c∗ b∗
A 03444 41 5















Table 8: Example showing the manipulability of the Borda and the ISU rules
48Original Proﬁle
Proﬁle Criteria-94
s 12345ρn ρ bρ b
A 1323434 91 3
B 2114623 41 4
C 323533 4 11 16
D 5451143 61 6
E 454224 4 12 17
F 666656 5 29 29
Binary matrix Criteria-98
s ABCDEF c∗ b∗
A 033335 51 7
B 204334 41 6
C 210335 31 4
D 222035 21 4
E 222205 11 3
F 010000 01














s 123 45ρn ρ bρ b
A 1353433 71 6
B 2114623 41 4
C 322533 4 10 15
D 544114 4 10 15
E 4532233 71 6
F 666656 5 29 29
Binary matrix Criteria-98
s ABCDEF c∗ b∗
A 032225 21 4
B 204334 41 6
C 310335 41 5
D 322035 31 5
E 322205 21 4
F 010000 01












Table 9: Example showing the manipulability of the Borda, Kemeny, Copeland, and ISU-98
rules; also illustrating a conﬂict between (MRP) and (CC)
49Original Proﬁle
Proﬁle Criteria-94
s 12345ρn ρ bρ b
A 1214323 41 1
B 313313 5 11 11
C 442524 4 12 17
D 2342433 71 5
E 555155 5 21 21
Binary matrix Criteria-98
s ABCDE c∗ b∗
A 02444 31 4
B 30434 41 4
C 11024 18
D 12304 21 0
E 11110 04













s 1234 5 ρn ρ bρ b
A 1212324 6 9
B 3131113 3 9
C 442524 4 12 17
D 234444 5 17 17
E 555355 5 23 23
Binary matrix Criteria-98
s ABCDE c∗ b∗
A 02455 31 6















Table 10: Example showing the violation of (SM) and (LIIA) by (MRP) and the ISU-94 rule
50Short Program









I 91 19 9
J 10 8 10 10
K 11 10 11 11
L 12 12 12 12
M 13 13 13 13
N 14 14 14 14
O 15 15 15 15
P 16 16 16 16
Q 17 17 17 17
R 18 19 18 18
S 19 18 19 19
T 20 21 20 20
U 21 20 21 22
V 22 23 22 21
W 23 22 23 23
X 24 24 24 24
Y 25 25 25 25
Z 26 26 26 26















I 16 15 15 16
J 17 17 17 17
K 12 12 13 12
L 10 10 10 10
M 24 24 24 24
N 15 16 16 15
O 11 11 11 11
P 13 13 12 13
Q 14 14 14 14
R 9999
S 22 22 22 22
T 21 21 21 21
U 20 20 20 20
V 18 18 18 18
W 19 19 19 19
X 23 23 23 23
Y 25 25 25 25
Z 26 26 26 26
ZZ 27 27 27 27
Kem Bor ISU-94


































Table 11: Results of the 2002 women Olympic competition
51Short Program Free Skating Both Programs
M-1976
Kem Bor ISU-94






















































































Table 12: Comparison of the results of 16 Olympic competitions
52Short Program Free Skating Both Programs
P-1992
Kem Bor ISU-94











































































Table 13: Comparison of the results of 14 additional Olympic competitions
53